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Abstract
Economists agree that accounting specialists are helpful in avoiding taxes.
We argue that such help can often be called sophisticated evasion. We ana-
lyze it in a game of incomplete information played by tax authority, corporate
taxpayers and accounting specialist. When sophisticated evasion is very com-
mon, marginal changes in enforcement are not e¤ective, so radical measures
are needed for improving compliance. Fines on rms as opposed to specialists
are more e¤ective in facilitating such measures. When the evasion is modest,
auditing and accounting costs as opposed to nes are more e¤ective in curbing
it.
JEL Classication: H26, H32
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1 Introduction
The literature usually draws a line between lawful underreporting of tax obligations,
also known as tax avoidance, and illegal understatement, referred to as tax evasion1.
The paper is based on the second chapter of my doctoral thesis at European University Insti-
tute. I am thankful to Chaim Fershtman, Gregor Langus, Rick van der Ploeg, Ronny Razin and
Karl Schlag for discussion, as well as participants in seminars at EUI, Universities of Amsterdam,
Frankfurt, Hannover and EEA 2007 Meeting in Budapest.
1As stated, for example, in the survey by Andreoni et al. (1998)
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In reality, though, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between the two. In this
situation it makes sense to break down underreporting into simple and sophisticated
rather than into evasion and avoidance. We dene simple tax evasion as understate-
ment that does not require special expertise (accounting or nancial). Correspond-
ingly, understatement of tax liability that requires such special knowledge will be
called sophisticated tax evasion. It can be brought to existence by accounting rms
that provide evasion among other services, which is the case in CIS countries. Alter-
natively, it can be done by auditing rms that have to approve corporate reports in
the developed countries. The academic literature in this sphere is very scarce, so we
have to refer mostly to anecdotal evidence and newspaper articles.
The corporate tax evasion, as opposed to individual, can hardly be simple. For
one thing, corporations undergo regular (every three to ve years in most countries)
audits by the tax authorities. Thus, in order to hide simple evasion, a rm has to
either not perform a transaction legally, facing the problems of contract enforcement
and depriving itself from the benets of legislation, or to o¢ cially close down before
the corresponding check, rendering it impossible to gain reputation which is crucial
for successful functioning in many markets.
This does not mean that the corporate world is perfectly compliant, and the most
striking evidence comes from corporate scandals that keep entertaining us every
year2. They become possible with sophisticated evasion which is hard to detect, as it
requires counter-checking of many legal entities, some of which may be in a di¤erent
tax jurisdiction (another city, state, country) or even liquidated by the time of audit.
There are no exact gures about any kind of tax evasion at our disposal. For the
simple evasion, the shadow sector estimations presented, e.g. in Schneider (2006) are
a good proxy. The sophisticated evasion is eluding such attempts, as it is reported
and does look legal up to the moment the whole complicated arrangement is uncov-
ered. Thus, what we can observe here are really big cases, the results of rm audits,
and changes in the proportion of corporate tax revenues in total tax revenues. The
latter, as noted by Slemrod (2004) for the US, has fallen from 6.4 percent of GDP
in 1951 to less than 1.5 percent of GDP in the recent years. An indirect evidence
for growing sophisticated evasion is provided by the fact that Americas largest and
most protable companies paid less in corporate income taxes in last three years,
2A recent example being perhaps the German tax scandal related to Liechten-
stein as a tax haven, details available in the Economist (Feb 21, 2008), online at
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10733044
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even as they increased prots, as Browning (2004) states.
In CIS countries, the study by Movshovich (1999) shows that sophisticated evasion
accounts for about 90% of all corporate tax evasion. Moreover, the famous scandal
with Yukos has opened up a bit the mechanism of such evasion for the general public.
In two words, the oil giant managed to reduce its corporate tax liability virtually to
zero by shifting its operations on paper to a small republic within Russia and making
special arrangements with the regional government. It is common knowledge that
other Russian corporations were not far from Yukos in terms of tax arrangements,
but avoided prosecution.
The corporate scandals are not a rarity in the more civilizedcountries, either.
A broad collection of material about such scandals3 is prepared by Roy Davies and
includes Enron and Parmalat as probably most famous cases. An excellent collection
of US corporations involved in scandals is due to Citizen Works4.
The principle feature of the corporate scandals is that ctitious contracts are
made to overstate performance of a company. This is used to boost benets of chief
executives and stock price, and tax fraud comes as a by-product of such e¤orts.
Despite being a secondary goal, the tax evasion in these cases is very substantial and
it is currently increasing, as anecdotal evidence suggests (Johnston 2003a,b).
Apart from the scandals, sophisticated evasion is represented by conventional tax
shelters. The following examples of common in the US shelters may seem benign,
but taken at a large scale are very detrimental to the social welfare5: (i) deferring
taxes to later years; (ii) obtaining leverage through various nancing arrangements;
(iii) deducting prepaid interest; (iv) not including prepaid income.
How can the auditors help in sophisticated evasion6? First, they have to certify
the tax reports for public corporations. This also means that the auditors are an
essential part of sophisticated evasion schemes. Secondly, they may actually assist
smaller corporations, providing tax consulting that may include evasion. That is why
in our paper the key role is played by the accounting specialist, modelled as a local
monopolist (alternatively, it can be a number of tacitly colluded specialists) providing
3Available at http://www.exeter.ac.uk/~RDavies/arian/scandals/classic.html#credit.
4Can be found on http://www.citizenworks.org/enron/corp-scandal.php
5The list and a discussion of tax shelters vs IRS measures to curb them can be found at
http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/offon/usa_new/usashelt.html
6For a last year scandal involving KPMG (one of the four big auditors) check
http://www.itcinstitute.com/display.aspx?id=2021
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sophisticated evasion service for a set of real sector rms.
Another application of our setup is even more direct: in CIS countries the evasion
service is usually provided by an accounting rm associated with a commercial bank.
This way every client of a bank has an option to arrange its accounts to minimize
its tax obligations. The accounting rm is a local monopolist, as there are substantial
costs of changing a bank, and hence the evasion specialist. There is a lot of anecdotal
evidence for money laundering through the Russian banks. The sophisticated evasion
goes hand in hand with laundering; in most cases it is di¢ cult or impossible to
separate the two phenomena7.
The economic literature to date has accumulated a number of contributions to
the analysis of tax evasion in presence of tax specialists. On the side of the theory, a
representative paper is by Reinganum and Wilde (1993) who focus on the potential
of the specialists to lower the costs of ling reports. Using a game of perfect infor-
mation, they come to the conclusion that the tax authority audits reports prepared
by tax specialists more intensively. The empirical research is represented by studies
of Klepper at al. (1991) and Erard (1993). The principle nding here is that the
specialists inhibit evasion on unambiguous items (simple evasion in our terms), but
stimulate it on ambiguous items (sophisticated evasion).
We are extending the existing literature by including another type of tax specialists
in the analysis. We are not describing the certied lawyers and accountants that help
to ll in tax reports. Rather, we have in mind nancial rms (or divisions) that run
accounts of the real sector rms in case of the developing countries, or the auditors
that verify the accounts of public corporations in the developed countries. Therefore,
we assume that the rms cannot opt for simple evasion, and that is a special feature
of corporate as opposed to personal tax evasion.
The academic interest in corporate tax evasion is growing, and we present three
recent examples here. Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006) provide a general macroeconomic
framework for analyzing tax evasion by rms, showing that standard equivalencies of
di¤erent taxes break down. Crocker and Slemrod (2005) study incentives of chief -
nancial o¢ cers (CFO) and shareholders to engage into evasion activities in a principal
- agent framework. They characterize the optimal contract in presence of asymmetric
information about the magnitude of the legal tax deductions and nd out that the
penalties imposed on the tax manager reduce evasion more than do those imposed
7An example of a bank connected to an evasion specialist can be found in Zheglov (2006).
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on the shareholders.
Chen and Chu (2005) look instead at the incentives of chief executive o¢ cers when
the contracts between them and shareholders are not enforceable. They assume that
the rewards can be conditioned on the reported, but not on the actual prot, and
show that the gain from evasion may only come at the expense of the loss in internal
control at the rm.
Though their insights are interesting, we believe the setup chosen by Crocker
and Slemrod is more realistic. First, it is the nancial and not executive o¢ cers
who actually run the accounts. The production (or organization) process is fairly
separated from the nancial ow, so that ddling accounts does not interfere with
the top managersincentives8. Secondly, tax evasion and informal sector in general
do exhibit contract enforcement methods other than court decision. In particular,
personal and long-term relations are important.
To further the analysis of corporate tax evasion, we endogenize the response of
tax authority to the reporting behaviour of the rms and model nancial specialists
in a novel way. The reason for the former is that exogenous audit probability seems a
too strong assumption, for the latter - that we want to target the auditor rms or ex-
ternal accounting specialists rather than internal nancial services. Both the auditors
and the accounting specialists are relevant players in the sophisticated tax evasion
phenomenon, as the public corporations are obliged to undergo external auditing,
whereas smaller corporations do not usually have resources to arrange sophisticated
tax evasion internally.
Featuring the role of tax specialists in corporate tax evasion, our paper establishes
the relation between tax collection parameters and the amount of evasion. We do
not aim at explaining how the evasion industry comes to existence, or whether the
evasion specialists play some useful role in society. We take this sector as given and
look at how tax rates, nes and industry structure can a¤ect it. The interaction
between tax authority, rms and evasion specialists is modelled as a static game
of incomplete information in spirit of Reinganum and Wilde (1986). The perfect
Bayesian equilibrium is used as a solution concept, and simple intuition is used for
equilibrium selection.
First, we nd equilibria of the evasion game with an exogenous price for specialist
8Or may even run in the opposite direction, as CEOs remuneration packages often depend on
the o¢ cial prot gures.
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service. In addition to the separating equilibrium analyzed by Reinganum and Wilde,
we discuss a pooling equilibrium, in which everybody evades everything, and a hybrid
equilibrium, in which low prot rms are pooling their reports and high prot rms
are separating. We only select equilibria with pooling at zero report being a natural
focal point for the rms. The ratio of auditing costs to enforcement parameters
determines whether only pooling is possible or separating and hybrid equilibria may
exist.
Secondly, we provide a full description of the selected equilibrium of the whole
game for both monopolistic and competitive structure of the industry of tax special-
ists. We show that the monopolistic specialist chooses either full cheating situation,
or separating (hybrid) equilibrium with a constant across incomes evasion level. Com-
petitive specialists may additionally nd themselves in a separating equilibrium with
evasion level decreasing in income. Tax evasion volume when the specialists compete
is at least as large as in the monopolistic situation.
The nes on rms are more e¤ective in driving economy away from complete
evasion than those on the specialist. This is in contrast to the result in Crocker and
Slemrod (2005), stating that the nes on managers (agents) are preferable to those
on rms (principals). Intuitively, in their framework higher CFO nes lead to the
restructuring of the evasion favouring contract. In our setting, the rms play a role
of agents (the specialist being a principal), and it is better to ne rms, as they
prefer high evasion regime. The nding provides rationale for little e¤ort Russian
government made in identifying and punishing evasion specialists.
For the developed countries with low levels of evasion our model points out the
importance of compliance enhancing factors other than conventional enforcement.
Indeed, in the separating equilibrium it is innitely costly to ensure extinction of
specialists by raising nes or simple auditing intensity. Moreover, with higher com-
pliance it is increasingly costly to reduce sophisticated evasion by tougher punishment
- a more promising way to ght it is through an increase in costs of muddling accounts.
The model setup is presented in section 2, the description of equilibria for an
exogenous price follows in section 3. Price setting by the specialist is considered in
the section 4, followed by the government problem in section 5. Section 6 contains
a discussion of alternative specications of the model. In conclusion the results are
summarized and policy implications are suggested.
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2 The Model
Imagine the world in which there is a continuum of rms with measure one, each
characterized by some prot . The magnitude of this prot is a realization of a
random variable  distributed over the interval [min; max] according to a cdf F that
has a nite mean and strictly positive density everywhere on its domain. We require
min be nonnegative.
There is a prot tax with a at rate t, together with surcharge rates per unit of
evaded tax, s1 on the rms and s on the specialist, set by the government. After
observing its prot, each rm has to decide how much tax it wants to evade. To do
so, the rm has to ask the tax specialist for assistance, e. g. to forge some bills issued
by ctitious rms.
There is a tax authority that visits rms costlessly with a basic frequency r1.
Conditioned upon a visit, the probability to detect sophisticated evasion is r. The tax
authority can choose this probability, but it is costly. The simple auditing probability
r1 is exogenous to the decision of the tax authority, as we think about it as reecting
resources that the government decided to invest in tax compliance monitoring, e.g.
a law determines how often the authority should visit the rms. As long as the tax
authority has a limited budget, we have to assume r1 < 1, though we shall also discuss
a degenerate case in which r1 = 1.
2.1 Sequence of moves and information
The evasion specialist moves rst, quoting the price p per unit of unreported income
at which it is ready to forge documents. The second move is made by nature, which
assigns a type embodied in the prot level  for each of the rms. The rms move
third, deciding on how much prot to report r. The tax authority moves last,
deciding on the auditing probability r after observing the rmsreports. After this,
payo¤s to the tax specialist, rms, and tax authority are realized. The tax rate t,
surcharge rates s1 and s, and basic auditing frequency r1 are exogenous parameters
characterizing institutional arrangement of the game.
All these parameters are common knowledge. The realization of its own prot
 is known to the rm and to the tax specialist, the distribution F of the random
variable  is common knowledge.
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2.2 Players and strategies
1. Specialist. Consider a local monopolist who sets price p 2 (0; 1) to maximize its
expected prot, taking into account the response of the real sector r (p; ) (further
we drop the arguments for brevity) and a punishment for soliciting evasion s. The
realized prot of the specialist is
 = pE (   r)  cs(E (   r))  str1Er (   r) ; (1)
where E (   r) is the total evaded income, cs (:) is the cost function of the specialist.
Note that the realized and the expected prot are equal, as the specialist serves an
innite population of the real sector rms.
2. Taxpayers. Each of the rms characterized by prot  2 [min; max] maximizes
the expected after-tax prot I by choosing the tax report r (p; ) 2 [0; ]:
I(; r) =    tr   p (   r)  t(1 + s1)r1r (   r) : (2)
3. Tax authority. It chooses r (r; p) given a belief about , observed report r
and known prot distribution F to maximize expected revenue
R(r; r; ) = tr + rr1t(1 + s+ s1)(E f jr g   r)  c(r); (3)
where ( jr ) is a belief about the distribution of true prots given the reported
prots:
E f jr g =
maxZ
min
d( jr ):
In the case of separating equilibrium there are point beliefs
E f jr g = ^(r) : [0;+1)! [min; max] :
Notice that despite of complete revelation in a separating equilibrium, the tax au-
thority has to incur the auditing costs in order to prove that the sophisticated evasion
has actually taken place. Sending letters to the taxpayers with claims about their
hidden income would not be credible.
3 Exogenous price
We rst consider exogenous specialist price, i.e. the subgame that excludes the spe-
cialist from the list of players. We call a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this
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subgame complete pooling, if everybody submits zero reports; we call it complete
separating, if each rm submits a di¤erent report; we call it hybrid, if some reports
are distinct and some are pooled. In any perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (i) the
reporting strategy of each rm is maximizing its expected after-tax prot given the
verication policy of the authority; (ii) the verication strategy of the authority is
maximizing its tax revenue given the beliefs about the reporting strategy; (iii) the
beliefs about the reporting strategy are consistent with the actual reports by the
rms.
We take the audit cost function from an example in Reinganum and Wilde (1986)
with c(r) =  c ln(1   r). We rst characterize a complete separating equilibrium,
in which we greatly borrow from Reinganum and Wilde (1986) (they have derived
our strict equilibrium in a setting without specialist price). We call the separating
equilibrium strict, if each rm strictly prefers to make its equilibrium report; we call
it weak, if all the rms are indi¤erent between making the equilibrium report and
some other report.
Denote the equilibrium values of report r, which is a function of prot , and
probability of deep auditing r; equilibrium point belief about the true income ^ (r).
Before characterizing the equilibria of our subgame, we state a lemma that species
how the tax authority responds to a prot report (denote  := (1 + s+ s1) tr1):
Lemma 1 Consider a subgame dened by given specialist price p. The best response
of the tax authority with a belief  to a tax report r is
r (r; ) = 1  c
 (E f jr g   r) : (4)
The proof of the lemma and the propositions 1-3 can be found in the appendix.
In the following proposition we establish the existence conditions for the separating
equilibrium in our subgame (denote B :=   (t  p) (1 + s+ s1) = (1 + s1)):
Proposition 1 (separating equilibrium) Consider a subgame dened by given spe-
cialist price p. Assume the auditing is cheap, c= < min.
(i) If t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) < p  min

t
 
1  r1 (1 + s1)
 
1  c (min) 1

; t
	
, there ex-
ists a complete separating (strict) equilibrium characterized by the triple fr; r; ^g
with r dened by
   r () =

c

  c
B

e
B
c
(r() r(max)) +
c
B
; (5)
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r = 1  c
 (^   r)
; (6)
^ (r) =
8>><>>:
min; r < 

r (min) ;
 1r () ; r 2 [r (min) ; r (max)] ;
max; r > 

r (max) :
(ii) If t
 
1  r1 (1 + s1)
 
1  c (min) 1

< p  t, there exists a complete separating
(weak) equilibrium characterized by the triple fr; r; ^g with r dened by
   r () =
c


1  t  p
(1 + s1)tr1
 1
(7)
and expressions (6).
(iii) If p > t there exist a complete separating (honesty) equilibrium characterized by
r = ; (8)
r  0;
^ (r) =
(
 1r () ; r 2 [r (min) ; r (max)] ;
max; r =2 [r (min) ; r (max)] :
The analysis of the pooling equilibria in our game is complicated by the fact that
there is a continuum of them9. However, we choose the pooling at zero report as
an obvious focal point. We also do not consider all kinds of hybrid equilibria that
could potentially arise in the subgame except for the pooling at zero report for the
types below certain prot and separating for the types above it. The reason for this
is that we want to distinguish clearly high evasion regime (complete pooling) and low
evasion regime (complete separation or hybrid).
Proposition 2 (hybrid equilibrium) Consider a subgame dened by given special-
ist price p. Assume the auditing is not very expensive, min < c= < E (j  0),
where 0 simultaneously solves (5) and the indi¤erence condition I(0; r (
0)) =
I(0; 0).
(i) If t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) < p  min
n
t

1  r1 (1 + s1)

1  c (E (j  0)) 1

; t
o
,
there exists a hybrid (strict) equilibrium characterized by the triple fr; r; vg with
r dened by (5), r
 dened by (6) for any   0 and
r () = 0; (9)
r = 1  c
E (j  0)
9Note that intuitive or divinity criteria are not applicable in our subgame, as it has a continuum
of types.
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for any  < 0. The beliefs are
( jr ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
F (j  0) ; if r = 0;
D; if 0 < r < r (
0) ;
 1r () ; r 2 [r (0) ; r (max)] ;
max; r > 

r (max) ;
(10)
8DjED f jr g  E
 
j  0+ r:
(ii) If t

1  r1 (1 + s1)

1  c (E (j  0)) 1

< p  t, there exists a hybrid
(weak) equilibrium characterized by the triple fr; r; vg dened by (6)-(7) for any
  0 and (9) for any  < 0. The beliefs are determined according to (10).
(iii) If p > t there exist a complete separating (honesty) equilibrium characterized by
(8).
The following proposition establishes existence conditions for the complete pooling
at zero equilibrium:
Proposition 3 (pooling equilibrium) If p  t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) or c= > E,
there exists a complete pooling equilibrium characterized by the triple fr; r; g with
r  0; (11)
r = max

0; 1  c
E

;
( jr ) =
(
F () ; if r = 0
D; if r > 0
;
8DjED f jr g  max

E;max  
max
E
  1
 c


:
A separating equilibrium does not exist.
We see that there two factors that determine what kind of equilibrium exists: (i)
relative auditing costs c=, (ii) specialist price p. When the auditing costs are very
small, c= < min, there may be complete separating or complete pooling equilib-
rium, depending on the specialist price. When the costs are higher, min < c= <
E (j  0), complete separating equilibrium does not exist; the specialist price de-
termines whether hybrid or pooling equilibrium is played. For substantial auditing
costs, c=  E (j  0), the equilibrium is either pooling or in mixed strategies,
so in our subsequent analysis we assume c= < E (j  0).
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For a small specialist price there is complete pooling equilibrium, i.e. no rm
submits a truthful report and the tax authority picks the rms for auditing with
uniform probability. For a higher price there is separating or hybrid equilibrium, in
which each rm with high enough prot evades a part of it, and the tax authority can
deduce the prot of such rms from their reports. When the price is prohibitively
high, all the rms submit truthful reports and the tax authority does not perform
deep auditing, so we have full honesty equilibrium.
Intuitively, in the pooling equilibrium any rm should prefer submitting zero re-
port to submitting a positive one. Thus, the gain from decreased auditing probability
at higher report should not outweigh the loss of the prot from foregone evasion. If
the authority believes that any positive report implies higher than average prot, it
will not reduce its optimal auditing e¤ort enough to make non-zero report attractive.
Then for such out-of-equilibrium belief of the authority pooling at zero is equilibrium
with the correct equilibrium belief being unconditional distribution of prots.
In any equilibrium, a rm plays the best response to both verication strategy of
tax authority and reporting behavior of other rms. In a separating equilibrium with
r() strictly increasing, every rm chooses the report in such a way that it reveals
its prot level. This happens, if p > t (1  r1 (1 + s1)). When the price of auditing
is high enough, t
 
1  r1 (1 + s1)
 
1  c (min) 1

< p  t, the rms are indi¤erent
between evading and reporting, so we have weak separating equilibrium.
The same logic applies to the hybrid equilibrium. The di¤erence is that all rms
with the prot below 0 submit zero reports. This allows for more intensive auditing of
the lowest reports than in complete separation case. Hence, hybrid equilibrium exists
when auditing is costly enough for complete separation to fail. Hybrid equilibrium
is not distribution-independent: the threshold level of prot 0 at which a rm is
indi¤erent between submitting zero or positive report is determined by the shape of
prot distribution.
For p > t evasion would not make sense, so the rms report full prot. The lower
threshold for price, t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) denes whether there is pooling or separating
equilibrium (recall that we select pooling at zero whenever separating or hybrid equi-
librium does not exist). This threshold is determined by the the tax rate and the
ne faced by a rm in case of detection: the higher the ne, the smaller is the range
where the separating (hybrid) equilibrium does not exist.
At the extreme, when all the rms are visited (r1 = 1) the threshold becomes
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 ts1, that is separation exists for any specialist price, given that the auditing is not
too expensive. The threshold is very intuitive, as t can be thought of as marginal
benet from evasion, whereas p + tr1 (1 + s1) as marginal costs for an audited rm
(r = 1). Thus, when the benets are higher even for a detected evader, no separation
can exist (everybody evades everything). However, in reality the tax authority never
has the resources to inspect all the rms, so r < 1. In fact, the evidence summarized
in Andreoni et al (1998) implies that in reality r1 (1 + s1) < 1, that is the auditing
probability is on average below its Nash equilibrium counterpart10.
This completes the description of the game between tax authority and taxpayers.
It is valid for any industrial structure of the specialist service ranging from perfect
competition to monopoly. In any case, for low specialist price an equilibrium with
rms evading everything is played; for higher price a separating equilibrium with
rms evading some part of their prot is played; for a price higher than the tax rate
all rms report honestly.
Before looking more closely at the price setting behaviour of the specialist, we
formulate two results that characterize the evasion behaviour in the separating or
hybrid equilibrium considered.
Dene equilibrium evasion volume e () :=    r ().
Proposition 4 In the complete separating equilibrium dened by the reporting func-
tion (5), evasion volume is a decreasing and concave function of prot, de
()
d
<
0; d
2e()
d2
< 0.
The proof is left to the appendix E. The decreasing evasion is a counter-intuitive
result, as we would expect the rich to evade more. After all, their reports are audited
less. In our setting though, if they evade more, they get audited disproportionately
more, thus preferring to stay at their separating equilibrium report. This does not
contradict a common sense that evasion makes the tax system more regressive. In-
deed, without evasion the linear tax rate implies a neutral tax system. In separating
equilibrium though the tax system becomes regressive, as after tax expected income
is increasing faster than before-tax income. Formally, this leads us to the following
corollary:
10We do not endogenize the basic auditing probability r1, as we believe this decision has
substantially longer horizon than the auditing intensity r. Moreover, it is likely to be a
government, not a tax authority decision. Hence, it is may be chosen to maximize welfare
and not the tax revenue.
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Corollary 1 In the complete separating equilibrium dened by the reporting func-
tion (5), the linear tax is regressive, d
2I
d2
= (t  p  t(1 + s1)r1) @2e()@2 > 0.
This result can be obtained by direct di¤erentiation of the expected after-tax
prot (2).
4 Price setting
In the previous section we considered evasion subgame equilibria for any xed spe-
cialist price p. The interesting question is though which price would specialist want
to charge, if it were a monopolist11. For simplicity we assume here a linear cost
function of the specialist, cs (x) = csx. Clearly, if cs  t, the honesty prevails, so
there is no space for the specialist. Otherwise, if cs < t, the specialist can choose
any price p 2 (t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) ; t) to get a separating or hybrid equilibrium, or any
price p  t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) to get pooling, or else close down ensuring zero prot and
complete honesty. Formally, the specialist maximizes its prot by choosing p:Z max
min
(p  cs   str1r (r (p; ))) (   r (p; )) dF () : (12)
The following condition turns out to be important for the specialists decision:
t  cs < : (13)
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium play in our game:
Proposition 5 The specialist is anticipating the subgame play given by Propositions
1-3. Its prot is maximized at
(i) a separating equilibrium with the price t, if the condition (13) is satised.
(ii) a pooling equilibrium with the price pp = t (1  r1 (1 + s1)), if the condition (13)
is not satised and the following relation holds:
(p   cs   str1)
Z max
min
e (p; ) dF () < (t  cs   )E + cs
1 + s+ s1
: (14)
11Monopolistic structure seems most realistic for the evasion industry. For the details see intro-
duction.
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Here p is determined by the following relation:Z max
min
e (p; ) dF () + (p   cs   str1)
Z max
min
ep (p
; ) dF () = 0:
(iii) a separating equilibrium with the price p 2 (pp; t], if the conditions (13) and
(14) are not satised.
The formal proof of (i) is left to the appendix F. If the condition (13) is satis-
ed, the prots from separating or hybrid equilibrium are maximized at the highest
possible separating price, t. In (ii) and (iii) the condition (13) is not satised, so the
specialists prot from separating equilibrium may be maximized at an interior. That
is why in (14) we implicitly compare prots from separation and pooling. Note that
positive prot in pooling equilibrium is assured by the violation of condition (13),
and this implies that whenever the condition (14) is satised, there is a positive prot
in separation as well.
Intuitively, if the nes are too low, t  cs > , either pooling or separation can be
played depending on the structure of the nes. If t   cs < , the system ends up in
a separating or hybrid equilibrium with p = t.
4.1 Payo¤s and comparative statics
The proposition above characterizes the equilibrium of the game with a specialist. In
the following we discuss the factors that (i) a¤ect cheating and auditing in the sepa-
rating equilibrium; (ii) inuence the behaviour of agents in the pooling equilibrium;
(iii) drive the system into separation or pooling.
4.1.1 Separation at p = t
The specialist prots under separation or hybrid equilibrium can be obtained by
substituting p = t into (12):
s =
c

(t  cs) : (15)
The prot is increasing in the tax rate, auditing costs and decreasing in enforcement
parameters and specialists costs. Notice that the specialist extracts all the rent from
the tax evasion, leaving the rms indi¤erent between cheating and being honest.
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In this equilibrium the auditing never happens, and evasion e (t) = c= is minimal
and constant across income levels (apart from the pooled types in a hybrid equilib-
rium). The comparative statics is conventional here: evasion is increasing in auditing
costs and decreasing in enforcement parameters; nes on rms and the specialist have
an equivalent impact.
4.1.2 Pooling
Substituting p = t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) into (12), we get specialist prots in pooling
p = (t  cs   )E + cs
1 + s+ s1
: (16)
The prot is trivially decreasing in the specialists costs and increasing in auditing
costs. It is increasing in the tax rate if the enforcement is not su¢ ciently strong
(1 + s+ s1) r1 < 1 and decreasing otherwise. The ne on the rms unambiguously
decreases specialists protability, but the ne on the specialist may actually increase
it. This happens whenever
c
1 + 2s+ s1
1 + s+ s1
< E;
and hence guarantied for small auditing costs. Notice that in the pooling equilibrium
a part of the rent is left with the rms to make sure they do not prefer partial evasion
of separating equilibrium. Everybody evades everything in this case: r  0.
The deep auditing probability is given by r = 1 c= (E), and it approaches unity
as the auditing costs approach zero. The probability has conventional properties: it
is decreasing in auditing costs and decreasing in enforcement parameters, tax rate
and rmsprot.
4.1.3 Separation versus pooling
We have seen that the low auditing costs and high nes are good for separation. The
higher specialist costs give more chances for separation as well. The impact of the
enforcement mix is ambiguous: stricter enforcement in terms of s1 decreases marginal
attractiveness of separation at p = t by (t  cs) c=2, but also decreases that of
pooling by E + cs= (1 + s+ s1)
2. Thus, the condition for a stricter enforcement to
work into the direction of separation is E (1 + s+ s1)
2 =c+s > (t  cs) = (tr1)2. This
is only not satised for small values of r1.
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5 Government
Now, consider the government that cares about reduction of evasion. Similarly to
Crocker and Slemrod (2005), we look at the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent nes in deterring
evasion and get a non-equivalence result. In separating equilibrium both nes are
equally e¤ective, as can be seen from (15). In pooling equilibrium, they are equally
ine¤ective, as the evasion volume is locally insensitive to the enforcement parameters.
An interesting case is a jump from pooling equilibrium (ii) to separating or hybrid
equilibrium (iii), and here nes on the real sector rms do a better job, as the following
proposition states.
Proposition 6 If the condition (13) is not satised and there is a pooling equilibrium,
the nes on the real rms are more e¤ective in pushing the system to a separating
equilibrium then the nes on the specialist are.
Proof. We prove the proposition for the corner case p = t. The more general case is
considered in the appendix G. Let us go back to the condition (14). In the corner case
the condition takes the form (t  cs   str1) c= < (t  cs   )E. The term  str1
tells us that s has an additional push back from separation to pooling in comparison
to s1. Indeed, if s = 0, the additional term disappears. Formally, dene a function
P that takes negative values if and only if the equilibrium of the game is pooling,
P := c (t  cs   str1)    (t  cs   )E. The e¤ectiveness of a ne in the sense of
the present proposition is then just a derivative of the function P with respect to the
corresponding ne. It can easily be seen that dP
ds
=  ctr1 + dPds1 < dPds1 , Q.E.D.
This provides a rationale for the recent situation in Russia when the specialist
rms were not liable for the evasion of their clientele. Our model indeed predicts
that the whole burden of punishment should lie on the rms actually evading tax.
The intuition for not punishing specialists even though they take all the rents in a
separating equilibrium is simple: the rms are favouring full cheating more, because
they get a part of the pie in the pooling equilibrium. Thus, a ne on rms that drags
the system out of full cheating is not su¢ cient to reach separating equilibrium when
put on the specialists.
Apart from this nding, we summarize the comparative statics for the two types of
equilibria we have. The auditing probability in the pooling equilibrium 1  c= (E)
is increasing in nes, tax rate, and the supercial auditing frequency. It is decreasing
in the costs of auditing. The intuition is straightforward: the former factors increase
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the direct benets of a deep audit, the latter increase its costs. The evasion volume
is obviously not sensitive to parameter changes in the pooling equilibrium.
In separation with p = t, there is no auditing, so the auditing probability is
insensitive to the parameters shifts. The cheating volume c= is a standard result
also obtainable from conventional models without specialists. Of course, we should
keep in mind that relatively cheap auditing is crucial for all our results, as otherwise
full cheating is an unchallengeable outcome.
Having looked at what it takes to go from full cheating to separation, it is natural
to also ask the question of what it takes to go from separation to full honesty. In
other words, if the government wants to destroy specialists, as many newspapers
recommend, how costly would it be? As the evasion in separating equilibrium is xed
to c=, it is obviously innitely costly to get rid of it completely by raising nes. A
much more e¤ective way to make specialists inactive is to raise their costs all the
way up to the tax rate. This could be achieved through employing better accounts
monitoring and cross-checking systems, or by increasing the costs of running accounts
(in a fashion of Sorbannes-Oxley act).
Another testable hypothesis that stems from our analysis is the clustering e¤ect the
specialist has on evasion. When rms are evading taxes on their own, we can observe
any evasion volume in separating equilibrium, from full honesty to full cheating.
With the specialist acting strategically, the equilibrium is never characterized by the
intermediate volumes of evasion: either there is full cheating, or evading c=, which is
relatively little, or not evading anything. Thus, we expect evasion to be more clustered
at the extreme levels in countries or regions where specialists are more widespread.
Finally, let us emphasize how the optimal tools for ghting evasion depend on the
extent to which the evasion is spread in a society. When the sophisticated evasion
is pervasive, the marginal increase in enforcement is not likely to a¤ect compliance
behaviour. In terms of our model, the system exhibits inertia with respect to compli-
ance, when in the pooling equilibrium. It is the specialist who adjusts the price and
the tax authority that adjusts auditing - the rms keep evading everything. In such
circumstances, the system should be pushed to the separating equilibrium in order
to achieve any reduction in evasion. This can be done by the means of conventional
enforcement (nes and auditing intensity), but the corresponding change is bound to
be non-trivial.
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When the sophisticated evasion is rare, marginal changes in enforcement are ef-
fective in reducing it, but at increasingly lower rate. In our model, the separating
equilibrium exhibits full honesty only at the limit of innitely high nes. This hap-
pens because no matter what nes are, the specialist can e¤ectively insure herself
against them and provide as little evasion service as is protable for given nes. On
the other hand, if the specialist faces high costs of producing the evasion service, it
will decide to close down anyway. Therefore, with small evasion rates the government
may be better o¤ by making falsication of accounts more costly.
6 Discussion: alternative specications
6.1 Industry structure
One may wonder what happens in an industry plagued with sophisticated evasion,
if the specialists are not local monopolists as we have assumed above, but rather
compete in prices. In the rst stage of the game then each specialist quotes a price,
and the subgame with the lowest price as a xed price for specialist service follows.
As in a simplest Bertrand setting, the competition will drive the prices down to the
marginal costs. A complication in our model is that the marginal costs are increasing,
and the demand is kinked. Namely, the specialists marginal cost is cs+ str1r (r; p),
and the demand for the service is the subgame equilibrium evasion, whenever p  t.
One equilibrium candidate is charging minimal marginal cost cs. This is an equi-
librium only in a very special case of t = cs. If t > cs, the specialists charging p = cs
gets a loss of str1rE (   r ()), and has a protable deviation of not providing the
service at all. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium in this case:
Proposition 7 If the specialists compete in prices à la Bertrand in anticipation of
the subgame play given by Proposition 1-3 and t > cs, the equilibrium is characterized
by the following specialist price:
(i)
pwc =
cs (1 + s1) + st
1 + s+ s1
; (17)
if cs (1 + s1) + st > (  ce 1 (min))
 
r 11   (1 + s1)

. The weak separating equilib-
rium of the subgame is played.
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(ii)
psc = cs + str1

1  c
e (psc)

; (18)
e (psc) =
Z max
min
(   r (psc; )) dF () ; (19)
if t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) < psc  t
 
1  r1 (1 + s1)
 
1  c (e (min)) 1

. The strict sepa-
rating equilibrium is played.
(iii)
ppc = cs + str1

1  c
E

; (20)
if cs   str1c (E) 1 < t  . The pooling equilibrium is played in the subgame.
(iv) No pure strategy Bayesian SPNE exists, if none of the conditions (i)-(iii) is
satised.
Sketch of the proof. Any competitive equilibrium in our game must be char-
acterized by zero prot condition for the specialists. Depending on the subgame
equilibrium, this is expression (17), (18), or (20). Indeed, the cost of serving the
rms is
R max
min
(cs + str1r
 (r (p; ))) (   r (p; )) dF (), whereas the revenue is
p
R max
min
(   r (p; )) dF (). After equating and rearranging we get the expressions
above.
Consider possible deviations of any of the specialists (there can be any nite
number of them larger than one) charging the price specied by the proposition. The
deviations to any higher price bring about the same payo¤, i.e. zero. The deviations
to any lower price bring about losses. Note that rationing consumers at a lower price
does not help to reduce costs, as the tax authority observes the price, not the quantity,
and audits according to the best response specied in the subgame. Thus, we indeed
have an equilibrium strategy for all the specialists, if the specied price corresponds
to the subgame equilibrium.
Finally, we provide the conditions under which each of the subgame equilibria
is played. When the specialist costs are relatively high, the separating equilibrium
results in zero prot. When the cost are low, a separating equilibrium brings about
positive prots, so the rms charge a price low enough to trigger a pooling equilibrium.
When any separating equilibrium brings about positive prot, but the pooling equi-
librium results in a negative prot, the specialists randomize, and no pure strategy
equilibrium obtains.
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Competition is e¤ective in our setting: it drives the prots of the specialists to
zero independently of parameter values. Contrary to the monopolistic case, the real
sector rms are left with an expected surplus from evasion. In pooling equilibrium
this is of the magnitude (t (1  r1 (1 + s1))  ppc).
We want to compare the two industry structures according to the volume of
evasion they generate. First, the condition for the pooling is c (t  cs   str1) <
(t  cs   )E in the monopoly case versus  str1c < (t  cs   )E in the com-
petition case. It can be seen that the former condition is more stringent. Thus,
competition results in a larger evasion volume than a monopoly does, whenever
 str1 < (t  cs   )E=c < t   cs   str1. Second, in a separating equilibrium
the evasion volume is larger with competition whenever pc < t, as the monopolist
chooses a minimum of c=. This leads us to the following corollary.
Corollary 2 If the condition (13) is satised, evasion volume with competition among
the specialists is at least as high as with a monopoly.
The usual intuition from industrial organization theory goes through in our model:
monopoly leads to a reduction of production relative to competitive benchmark. In
our setup, it is the sophisticated evasion service that is being produced. Hence, in
so far as we do not like monopoly in production of goods, we should like it in
production of bads, in case it is too costly to eliminate such production altogether.
As we can see, our previous result about the relative e¤ectiveness of the nes still
holds in the absence of monopoly power. Namely, the same term  str1 makes ning
specialists better for the pooling. In the weak separating equilibrium the nes are
equally ine¤ective: their impact is completely o¤set by the adjustment of price, and
the evasion level stays at constant c (1  (t  cs)) 1. Remarkably, evasion level here
is increasing in tax rate, contrary to the monopolistic case.
6.2 Specialist cost function
One of the assumptions that restrict applicability of our analysis is the linear cost
function of the specialists. Indeed, one may believe that it becomes increasingly costly
to muddle through the accounts as the evasion volume increases both on the rm and
the industry levels. While the cost rise on the rm level is partially reected in the
detection probability increase, the industry level cost rise is left out of our model so
far.
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At the same time, there can be the opposite spillover e¤ect: it is costly to develop
a complicated evasion scheme, but, once developed, it can be applied to many rms
relatively inexpensively. This technology e¤ect may actually provide an additional
justication for the monopolistic structure of the industry of sophisticated evasion.
We shall think about the spillover e¤ect as some xed costs needed to start the
business. The opposite e¤ect can be captured by a convex cost function. The spe-
cialists objective function (12) then becomesZ max
min
(p  str1r (p; )) e (p; ) dF ()  cs
Z max
min
e (p; ) dF ()

  C: (21)
Consider the xed costs C rst. As they do not distort the pricing decision of the
monopolist, all our results go through with a qualication that for high enough xed
costs full honesty equilibrium results.
The convexity does introduce additional complications, but the condition for prof-
its to be maximized at p = t can be reduced to an expression like (13), where
instead of cs we use c0s (e). A more precise condition can be written as e (t) +
(t  str1   c0s (e)) e0 (t)  0, which is of course a familiar inverse elasticity rule of
the monopolist adapted to our setting. Intuitively, depending on whether equilib-
rium evasion is larger or smaller than that in the linear cost case, the condition will
be correspondingly less or more restrictive. The separating equilibrium will be pre-
ferred for a larger set of parameter values, as full cheating becomes relatively more
costly. The rest of the story is virtually unaltered.
6.3 The authority cost function
The cost function of the authority used in our model may seem very specic. How-
ever, Reinganum and Wilde (1986) have shown that the separating equilibrium of
the type that we discuss exists for a large class of auditing function. Namely, they
assume c (0) = 0, twice continuous di¤erentiability with 0 < c0 (r) < 1; 0 < c00 (r) <
1; lim
r!1
c0 (r) = 1, and c0 (r) =c00 (r) + r > 1= (1 + s). The best response of the tax
authority is then
r (r; v) = c
0 1((E f jr g   r)); (22)
which is a generalized form of the expression (25).
Obviously, our strict separating equilibrium of the subgame is valid under the
same restrictions, as it completely mimics the equilibrium of Reinganum and Wilde.
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The weak separating equilibrium also exists under these conditions, with
e =
1

c0

t  p
(1 + s1)tr1

: (23)
Finally, the pooling at zero equilibrium also survives the generalization, with the
existence conditions modied appropriately.
We have chosen a specic function for a clear characterization of the subgame
equilibrium, but it can be seen that our equilibrium structure admits generalization
to the class of auditing functions in Reinganum and Wilde (1986).
7 Conclusion
The game between tax authority, taxpayers and a tax specialist featuring stylized
reality of corporate scandals and sophisticated evasion is analyzed in the paper. We
consider illiterate rms, i.e. the rms that do not know how to evade taxes. We
identify three types of equilibria for given specialist price: (i) complete pooling at
zero report; (ii) complete separation with true prot revelation; (iii) hybrid equilib-
rium with low types submitting zero reports and high types revealing their prot.
Furthermore, complete separating and hybrid equilibria can be of two di¤erent types,
strict or weak. As suggested by the term, in strict equilibrium the rms strictly prefer
to submit equilibrium report; in weak equilibrium the rms are indi¤erent between
cheating and reporting honestly. Finally, there is a special case of the separating
equilibrium in which all rms report truthfully.
Introducing the specialist who can choose the price for her services reduces the
number of equilibrium types for a large set of parameter values: the specialist chooses
between complete pooling and separating or hybrid equilibrium at the highest possible
price. That is why in separating or hybrid equilibrium the specialists gets all the
evasion rent, whereas in case of complete pooling she has to share it with the rms.
This, in turn, makes rms prefer pooling over separation.
The main result of the paper is twofold. First, for the high evasion regimes (devel-
oping countries, pooling equilibrium) the nes on the evading rms are more e¤ective
in driving the system out of full evasion than the nes on the specialist preparing
documents for this evasion. Secondly, for the low evasion regimes (developed coun-
tries, separating or hybrid equilibrium) increasing costs of complicating accounts is
more e¤ective than conventional enforcement measures.
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The success of Russian tax law enforcement policy seems to be well in line with
the former prediction of the model: the at taxreform was accompanied with both
large increase in punishment for evasion for the rms and no change in responsibility
of accounting specialists. Sorbannes-Oxley act in the US, on the other hand, may be
justied in light of the latter insight from the model.
Another result of our analysis is that auditing costs play a positive role in driving
the system to separating equilibrium. This gives a following policy advice: when the
situation with evasion is really bad, trying to invest in tax inspectorse¤ectiveness
may be a bad idea. It is wiser to make the enforcement stricter. On the other hand,
when the evasion is moderate, the inspectorscosts become a more e¤ective tool of
ghting non-compliance than nes and auditing intensity.
To eliminate sophisticated evasion completely is innitely costly according to our
model. In light of this the populist goals to get rid of money laundering and corporate
tax avoidance seem unrealistic. A promising step in this way, however, is increasing
costs of muddling through accounts.
Our results are robust to a number of changes in the model specication. Com-
petition between the specialists expands the set of possible equilibria and increases
tax evasion, but it does not change the equilibrium structure and the e¤ectiveness of
the enforcement instruments. Convex cost function of the specialist does not alter
the analysis. Finally, the equilibrium structure is preserved for a rather broad class
of monotonically increasing convex auditing functions12.
The analysis presented is by no means limited to the tax avoidance - evasion
phenomenon. A very similar problem arises, for example, in the interaction of com-
petition authority and rms that are colluding. Most often collusion agreement are
bound to be detected if not done through intermediaries - specialist rms. The same
story applied, these intermediaries should not be punished.
The paper could be extended in a number of ways. First, the rms could be given
opportunity to evade by themselves. Secondly, the government could be added as an
active rst mover to set institutional parameters in a way to maximize social welfare or
some other objective. Thirdly, the model could be extended to general equilibrium in
order to study welfare aspects of enforcement policies. Finally, it would be interesting
to consider dynamics of evasion in a context of repeated game.
12The equilibrium structure is also robust to introducing (not too high) risk aversion -
the equilibrium prices are just shifted down from t and t (1  (1 + s1) r1).
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Appendices
A - Proof of Lemma 1 - Tax authority best response
As we have seen, the tax authority maximizes
R(r; r;) = tr + r(E f jr g   r)  c(r);
the rst order condition is hence
 (E f jr g   r)  c0(r) = 0; (24)
and the second order condition is simply c00(r) > 0.
For the assumed cost function c(r) =  c ln(1  r) the FOC can be rewritten as is
r (r; ) = 1  c
 (E f jr g   r) ; (25)
which is the statement of the Lemma. In a separating equilibrium E f jr g = ^;
in case of pooling at zero or any other report below min, we have E f jr g =
E, as the only consistent belief of the authority is the true underlying distribution
( jr ) = F (). When the pooling is at a report above min, the belief is updated
according to Bayes formula ( jr ) = (F ()  F (r)) = (1  F (r)) for   r and
( jr ) = 0 for  < r as the tax authority knows that the taxpayers are rational.
But in this paper we restrict our attention to the pooling at zero equilibrium.
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B - Proof of Proposition 1 - Separating equilibrium
The separating equilibrium has to satisfy the following conditions: 1) absence of
deviation incentives for the taxpayer when the tax authority audits each report with
equilibrium probability; 2) absence of deviation incentives for the tax authority when
every taxpayer submits equilibrium report; 3) consistent beliefs of the tax authority
about the true income of the taxpayers who submit equilibrium reports; 4) arbitrary
beliefs of the tax authority about the true income of the taxpayer who submits out-
of-equilibrium report.
Concerning 2), the best response of the authority given its belief ^(r) is given by
(25). This is straightforward from the authority maximization problem (the payo¤ is
concave in r). The restriction on r is obviously 0  r  1, and it is satised whenever
(^(r)  r)  c (26)
In words, each report should bring more revenue than costs. If this condition does
not hold, the authoritys best response is not to audit the report.
For 1) and 3) we have to consider two cases, strict and weak equilibrium.
strict equilibrium
In the strict equilibrium (the rms strictly prefer the equilibrium reporting strategy)
the rms maximize their after-tax expected prot
   tr   (p+ t(1 + s1)r1r) (   r) :
The rst order condition to this problem is
 t  t(1 + s1)r1r0 (r) (   r) + p+ t(1 + s1)r1r = 0;
and the second order condition is
 r00 (r) (   r) + 2r0 (r)  0:
One can check that it is satised in equilibrium for our auditing function c(r) =
 c ln(1  r).
Plugging in the tax authority best response (assume ^   r > c), we can rewrite
the rst order condition as
1  c
 (^   r)   (   r)
c
 (^   r)2
(^0 (r)  1) = t  p
t(1 + s1)r1
:
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Using the consistent beliefs in the candidate equilibrium ^ = , we get
  c
 (^   r) ^
0 (r) =
t  p
t(1 + s1)r1
  1;
For convenience denoting evasion associated with a given report as e(r)  (r) 
r; e
0(r)  0(r)  1, we have
c (e0 + 1) =

1  t  p
t(1 + s1)r1

e:
Using B dened as in the text (B :=   (t  p) (1 + s+ s1) = (1 + s1)) we have
ce0  Be+ c = 0: (27)
This is a rst order ordinary di¤erential equation (DE). Its solution is a sum of
general solution to the corresponding homogenous DE and a particular solution to
the non-homogenous DE. Homogenous equation is ce0(r) Be(r) = 0. Its solution
is
e(r) = A exp frg ;  = B
c
:
To nd a particular solution, put e0(r) = 0 to get e(r) = cB : Thus, the general
solution of our equation will be e(r) = A exp

B
c
r
	
+ c
B
. To pin down the constant
A we need an initial condition, r (rmax) = 0 reecting the fact that the maximal
report should not be audited (we assume that it is not protable, which, strictly
speaking, does not have to be true unlessmax
R
R(r () ; e (r ()))dF () is achieved
at r (rmax) = 0). Thus,
1  c
 (max   rmax) = 0
rmax = max   c

:
After rearrangement, we have
A =

c

  c
B

exp

 B
c
rmax

:
This provides us with the expression (??).
For 3) we need the consistency of beliefs, that is the authoritys belief about (r)
must coincide with actual reporting strategy r(). This is only possible, if (r) is
increasing, and in this case consistency is actually ensured by the best responses in
our formulation. Then, the following condition should be satised:
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0 (r) = 1 +

c

  c
B

B
c
e
B
c (r max+ c) > 08r 2 [rmin; rmax]
It turns out to be useful to look at the coe¢ cient of the exponent, B=   1. It
is negative for p < t, and hence the coe¢ cient is negative. Using this to simplify
the condition for positive derivative, we get  <    B in case of B > 0, which is
obviously true. In case of B < 0 the condition is max < c=, but then the strict
separating equilibrium does not exist for p < t, as r  0 and all rms prefer evading.
To sum up the argument, B > 0 ) y0 > 0; B < 0 ) @y, so the separating
equilibrium may only exist for B > 0 or
p > t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) : (28)
What happens if the reporting is decreasing in the prot? Then the initial condi-
tion is
1  c
 (min   rmax) = 0
rmax = min   c

And so A is the same. The di¤erence is that there is no problem for 0 (r) < 0, so
that
0 (r) = 1 +

c

  c
B

B
c
e
B
c (r max+ c) < 0
B

  1

e
B
c
(r rmax) <  1
with B < 0 satised for sure. So the really binding in this case is of course r (max) 
0 
c

  c
B

exp

B
c
rmax

+
c
B
 max
We have to also respect the individual rationality constraint, that is the above
described reporting strategy should be preferred to honest reporting:
   tr   (p+ t(1 + s1)r1r) (   r) > (1  t);
which can be rearranged to obtain
p < t (1  r1 (1 + s1) r) :
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Since max r = 1  c
(min rmin) , we have
p < t

1  r1 (1 + s1)

1  c
 (min   rmin)

: (29)
The last check is for the equilibrium reports to be positive, as the negative re-
ports are not allowed (or do not make sense, since no negative tax is paid). The
corresponding restriction can be formulated as
c

  c
B

exp

B
c

c

  max

 min   c
B
:
Since 0 < B <  (the positivity required by consistency of beliefs discussed later), the
condition is satised for c=B < min, that is when p 2

t 

1  c
min

t(1 + s1)r1; t

- exactly when the rationality constraint is not satised.
When c=B > min > c=, the condition is actually satised for the interval p 2
t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) ; t 

1  c
min

t(1 + s1)r1

, as can be directly checked at the
borders (B = 0 and B = c
min
) and by monotonicity and continuity applies to the
whole interval.
Collecting the restrictions, we have c= < min; p 2

t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) ; t 

1  c
min

t(1 + s1)r1

as necessary and su¢ cient conditions for complete separating (strict) equilibrium ex-
istence.
weak equilibrium
In the weak equilibrium the rms are indi¤erent between submitting reports truthfully
and engaging into evasion. Formally,
   tr   (p+ t(1 + s1)r1r (r)) (   r) =    t:8
After rearranging this condition using the tax authority best response (25), which
with the constant evasion takes the form 1  c
e^
, we arrive at
e^ =
c


1  t  p
t(1 + s1)r1
 1
:
Imposing the consistency of beliefs e^ = e we get the expression in the proposition.
Note that restriction on evasion volume in this case is
c

< e < min;
30
which in terms of the price looks like
t

1  (1 + s1) r1

1  c
min

< p < t:
In this equilibrium the expected punishment is exactly equal to the expected gain
from the evasion regardless of the evasion level: t(1 + s1)r1r (r) = t  p. Protable
deviations are impossible, as any report brings about the same payo¤.
To complete the characterization of subgame equilibrium (requirement 4)), out-
of-equilibrium beliefs of the tax authority (for both strict and weak equilibrium) are
specied as  (r) =
(
min; r < rmin
max; r > rmax
. Note that we do not have to specify
beliefs for any possible deviation to reports in [rmin; rmax] ; as the tax authority has
no chance of observing such a deviation.
C - Proof of Proposition 2 - Hybrid equilibrium
We have shown that for c= > min, the complete separation equilibrium does
not exist. Here we are interested whether a hybrid equilibrium with the follow-
ing properties exists: (i) all the taxpayers with  2 [min; 0] submit zero reports;
(ii) all the taxpayers with  2 (0; max] submit di¤erent reports (0r; rmax]; (iii)
r (r > 0) < r (r = 0); (iv) I (0; 0) = I (0; 0r). The rst two are dening proper-
ties, the second is the decreasing in report auditing, the third follows from continuity
of the distribution. let us look at (iii) more closely.
Since we know the auditing has to be a best response in equilibrium, from (24) we
get for our auditing cost function r (r > 0) = 1  c(^ r) < 1  cE(j0) = r (r = 0)
or, in particular,
E
 
j  0 > ^0   0r: (30)
This is a consistency requirement on the side of the tax authority.
For the rms consistency, we need
I
 
0; 0

= 0   (p+ t(1 + s1)r1r (0)) 0
= 0   t0r  
 
p+ t(1 + s1)r1r
 
0r
  
0   0r

= I
 
0; 0r

we need the equality, because otherwise by continuity there is incentive to deviate.
Working out this condition, we arrive at
0   0r 
^0   0r
   0
E (j  0) =  
B
c
0r
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using consistency of beliefs, we get
B
c
0r =
0   E (j  0)
E (j  0) (31)
This actually denes the level of report 0r as a function of p and 
0 in the hybrid
equilibrium. This also immediately imposes B > 0 on the parameters. The problem
is that nothing pins down 0. However, if prot is distributed uniformly over [0; max],
this becomes 0r =
c
B
. Here the prot does not enter, because with uniform distrib-
ution the ratio
0 E(j0)
E(j0) is constant, which is not true for a general distribution.
We have to make sure that after-tax income is increasing in pre-tax income plus check
incentive and participation constraints as in case of complete separation.
strict equilibrium
Since the separation part of the problem is identical to the previous one (complete
separation), we get the same result up to 0, only cut at the point dened by (31).
So solving two equations simultaneously, we get 0 and 0r. For the uniform, we have
0 =

c

  c
B

exp

B
c

c
B
  max + c


+ 2
c
B
:
Combining the consistency conditions of the tax authority (30) and the rms (31),
we get
c
B
> E
 
j  0 > 0   0r:
For the uniform distribution, for example, it takes the form 0 < c=B, which is
satised.
The report is positive by construction, and evasion must be also positive. And it
is, since it is decreasing in report and at the maximal prot is positive c=. We have
to modify rationality constraint (29) to the analogous expression for the polled types
in hybrid equilibrium:
p  t  1  r1 (1 + s1) r  0; 0r :
To check for absence of deviation from the pooling part, we have
I
 
 ; 0

=     (p+ t(1 + s1)r1r (0))  
>     t0r  
 
p+ t(1 + s1)r1r
 
0r
  
    0r

= I
 
 ; 0r

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or 
t  p
t(1 + s1)r1
  r  0r 0r >  r (0)  r  0r  
Since r (0)   r (0r) > 0, the rhs increases in  . At 0 it reaches maximum with
equality, so the condition is indeed satised.
From the separating part,
I
 
+; 0

= +   (p+ t(1 + s1)r1r (0)) +
< +   t+r  
 
p+ t(1 + s1)r1r
 
+r
  
+   +r

= I
 
+; +r

or 
t  p
t(1 + s1)r1
  r  +r  +r <  r (0)  r  +r  +
by the same logic works for 0r. Thus also true for 
+
r , as I (
+; +r ) > I (
+; 0r)
by the separating part condition.
To complete the characterization of the hybrid equilibrium, out-of-equilibrium
beliefs of the tax authority should be specied. It is su¢ cient that 8r 2 (0; 0r)
r (0)  r (r) =) ED (jr)  r + E (j  0). Actually, for the pooled types it
su¢ ces to have ED (jr)  E (j  0) by the same logic as considered below for
complete pooling. For the separated types, a weaker su¢ cient condition is a mess, so
we do not state it here.
weak equilibrium
In the weak hybrid equilibrium the types below 0 evade everything; the types above
are indi¤erent between honesty and cheating. Using the same logic, we arrive at (7)
for the separating part. The restriction is slightly di¤erent,
p > t  t(1 + s1)r1r
 
0; 0

;
and complements the rationality constraint for the strict hybrid equilibrium.
D - Proof of Proposition 3 - Pooling equilibrium
A pooling equilibrium has to satisfy the following conditions: 1) absence of deviation
incentives for the taxpayer when the tax authority audits any report with equilib-
rium probability; 2) absence of deviation incentives for the tax authority when every
taxpayer submits zero report; 3) arbitrary beliefs of the tax authority about the true
income of the taxpayer who submits out-of-equilibrium report.
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As mentioned in the text, we only consider the pooling at zero equilibrium, as we
consider zero report a natural focal point for underreporting.
As far as 1) is concerned, the payo¤ from zero report should be preferred to
any deviation for any prot level. As for 2), tax authority chooses the auditing
probability (11) that maximizes its revenues given zero report. Finally, for 3) we
need an analogous expression for a deviator, and that should depend on the out-of-
equilibrium beliefs of the tax authority, that is it can be any belief. We consider an
arbitrary belief D, but notice that the most adverse for the deviator belief (and hence
most favourable for the equilibrium) is that the deviator has maximum prot max.
So, the net expected prot of the rm with gross prot  and a report r can be
written as
I (r; ) =    tr   p (   r)  t(1 + s1) (   r) r1r (r) ;
where the tax authority auditing is given by (24):
r(r; D) =
8>><>>:
1  c
E
; r = 0;
1  c
(EDfjr g r) ; r 2

0; ED f jr g   c
i
;
0; r  ED f jr g   c :
We have to then consider three cases:
I (0; ) =    p   t(1 + s1)r1

1  c
E

;
I (r; ) =    tr   p (   r)  t(1 + s1) (   r) r1

1  c
 (ED f jr g   r)

;
I (r ; ) =    tr   p (   r) :
First, we show that I (0; )  I (r ; )8; r  ED f jr g  c . As I (r ; ) is
decreasing in r, it is enough to show that the inequality holds for r = ED f jr g 
c

:
   p   t(1 + s1)r1

1  c
E

 (1  p)   (t  p)

ED f jr g   c


Thus, a su¢ cient condition for no deviation with a belief D such that ED f jr g >
max  
 
max
E
  1 c

is
t(1 + s1)r1  t  p;
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which as we have seen is complementary to the separating equilibrium existence con-
dition. A necessary one for a belief D is
t(1 + s1)r1
t  p max

1  c
E

+
c

 ED f jr g
Secondly, we show that I (0; )  I (r; )8; r 2

0; ED f jr g   c
i
. Note
rst that I (r; ) is decreasing in r, if the condition t(1 + s1)r1  t  p is satised
and if @ED f jr g =@r  1. Then it is enough to consider a marginal deviation:
   p   t(1 + s1)r1

1  c
E

    p   t(1 + s1)r1

1  c
ED f jr g

:
This is clearly satised for any out-of-equilibrium belief D such that ED f jr g 
E. So with p  t (1  (1 + s1)r1) the pooling at zero equilibrium exists.
In the rest of the paper we assume that the pooling at zero equilibrium is played
whenever the separating equilibrium (or considered hybrid equilibrium) does not exist.
As we have seen, this is only true for certain out-of-equilibrium beliefs. However, (i)
there is no complete pooling equilibrium that exists for any out-of-equilibrium beliefs,
(ii) considering all possible hybrid equilibria complicates the analysis substantially;
moreover, they are not likely to be more robust or realistic than the equilibria consid-
ered, (iii) having two extreme cases of separation (or hybrid) and pooling provides a
clear benchmark for the analysis of factors that a¤ect evasion volume in our setting.
E - Proof of proposition 4
Taking the reporting strategy (??), we di¤erentiate evasion volume with respect to
prot
de ()
d
= 1  d

r
d
=

B

  1

e
B
c
(r() r(max))d

r
d
:
We know that for p < t, B=   1 < 0. As dr
d
> 0 and the exponent is positive,
de()
d
< 0.
Di¤erentiating the evasion volume second time, we obtain
de2 ()
d2
=  d
2r
d2
=

B

  1

e
B
c
(r() r(max))
 
dr
d
2
+
d2r
d2
!
:
Rearranging, we get
de2 ()
d2
=

B

  1

e
B
c
(r() r(max))

dr
d
2
=

B

  1

e
B
c
(r() r(max)) + 1

:
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As the nominator is negative, the second derivative can only be positive, if the denom-
inator is negative. Since the minimum of the rst term of denominator is achieved
at  = max, we must have B   1 + 1 < 0, which is impossible. Thus, the second
derivative is negative, de
2()
d2
< 0.
F - Proof of proposition 5
From the equilibrium structure in propositions 1-3 we can see that the specialists
prot maximization (12) can be split into three subproblems: pooling, strict separa-
tion and (possibly) weak separation. The maximization in the pooling equilibrium
is trivial: since the evasion volume is xed, the local prot maximizing price is p =
t (1  r1 (1 + s1)). For the weak separating equilibrium the prot function can be
written as (p  cs   str1r) e, the rst derivative is
e+ (p  cs   str1) e0:
Using the explicit expression for e from (7) in proposition 1 this can be rewritten as
  t+ cs, which is positive i¤ condition (13) is satised. Thus, in this case the local
prot maximizing price is p = t. Correspondingly, the local maximizing price is the
minimal price that supports weak separating or hybrid equilibrium, i¤ condition (13)
is not satised.
The least tractable case is the strong separating or hybrid equilibrium. However,
we are able to show that under condition (13) it is strictly dominated by an equilibrium
with p = t. The condition for that is
(p  cs   str1)
Z max
min
(   r (p; )) dF () < (t  cs   str1) c

(32)
for t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) < p < t (1  r1 (1 + s1) r) :
After rearranging and using the fact that
R max
min
dF () = 1 and p  cs   str1  0
(otherwise the separating equilibrium brings about less than sure minimum of cs
1+s+s1
to
the specialist) we getZ max
min
(   r (p; )) dF () < c (t  cs   str1)
 (p  cs   str1) : (33)
From (??) we know that
   r(p; ) < c
B
8;
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(for a hybrid equilibrium this is only true for the separating part, and for the pooling
part there is a weaker condition E (j  0) < c=B, which is su¢ cient for us, asR max
min
(   r (p; )) dF () = E (j  0) +
R max
0
(   r(p; )) dF ()) so thatZ max
min
(   r(p; )) dF () <
Z max
min
c
B
dF () =
c
B
: (34)
Now, if also
c
B
<
c (t  cs   str1)
 (p  cs   str1) ; (35)
then the prot in any strict separating equilibrium is dominated by the prot at t.
Simply rearranging (35) we get
0 < + cs   t
This is the condition (13), so it is only left to show that under this condition the
full cheating equilibrium is never preferred:
c

(t  cs   str1) > (t  cs   )E: (36)
Since c= < E and str1 < , t cs str1 > t cs . We have just established, that
t  cs    < 0. If t  cs   str1  0, then (36) is clearly satised. If t  cs   str1 < 0,
then notice that 0 < c= < E and hence (36) is satised again.
G - Proof of proposition 6
As we have shown in the text that the statement of proposition is true for the corner
case of p = t, it is left to formulate a more general function P and show that dP
ds
< dP
ds1
.
Dene
P := (p   cs   str1)
Z max
min
e (p; ) dF ()  (t  cs   )E   cs
1 + s+ s1
:
This can be rewritten as
c

(t  cs   str1) +   (t  cs   )E
with a  > 0 standing for the di¤erence between the specialists prot at p and
t. The condition for dP
ds
< dP
ds1
is then d
ds
  d
ds1
< c

tr1, which is satised in our
equilibrium (derivation is not straightforward and available upon request).
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